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ABSTRACT A distinctive feature of the British approach until the 1960s was that 
vocational education and training (VET) should be provided by employers. This 
is conventionally contrasted with the much more formal state coordinated 
approach of Germany. The question posed is whether the British style was the 
‘spontaneous order’ that results because markets use information efficiently 
about the supply of and demand for skills. Alternatively, was it ‘spontaneous 
disorder’ in which the absence of standards and coordination led to under-
investment in VET and economic decline relative to those countries with strong 
leadership in education and training? There is considerable evidence in the 
twentieth century that Britain suffered from shortcomings in the availability of 
highly trained labour. The most credible explanation is the organisation and 
operation of the VET system; the perceived self-interests of undereducated 
employers and restrictive unions during booms and slumps provided inadequate 
conditions for efficient employer-led education and training. 
Vocational education and training (VET) contrasts with liberal education. In 
economic terminology, liberal education is consumption, worthwhile for its 
own sake; the student becomes better off, not because of access to employment 
or higher wages permitted by the education, but because of direct benefits 
conferred. On the other hand, VET is unambiguously concerned with 
investment in human capital, in preparation for work. It is a means to an end. 
In principle, VET may be undertaken at any level in industry – management, 
foreman, craftsman or shop-floor (Gospel, 1991). VET is broader than 
‘technical education’, being concerned with the supply of professional services 
– medicine, law, religion, accountancy, among others. However, to keep the 
scope of the article manageable, industry (rather than services or agriculture) 
will be the principal focus of the present discussion. 
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Over the centuries, economic growth created wider ranges of 
employment opportunities while technological change destroyed the value of 
some skills and enhanced the demand for others. In response to this turbulence, 
the British approach to vocational education and training has been 
decentralised and market driven. In particular, the essential principle was that 
VET should be provided by the employers who would be using the skills 
created, rather than by the state through formal education institutions. The 
heterogeneity of provision therefore creates a challenge for measurement; 
there are no obvious standardised units, such as years of schooling (by which 
investment in human capital more generally is often measured). 
This style of VET reflected the gradual nature of industrialisation in 
Britain and the broadly laissez-faire stance of economic policy until the First 
World War. It could be interpreted as a form of ‘spontaneous order’ in the 
supply of VET, undistorted by government planning. At all levels of British 
industry there was a reliance upon education and training ‘on the job’. The 
British style has often been contrasted with the German more formal and 
centralised system and assigned a role in the ‘decline of industrial Britain’ 
debate. For many admirers of the German model British VET seemed an 
ineffective ‘spontaneous disorder’.  
Advocates of ‘spontaneous order’ maintain that social institutions or 
systems of rules are most effective when they ‘evolve spontaneously’, as have 
common law and markets. Although not designed or intended by any one 
group they serve human purposes more effectively than deliberately contrived 
or centrally planned institutions (Hayek, 1967, ch. 6; Barry, 1995, p. 21). The 
doctrine is an approach to social problem solving analogous with the way in 
which genetic diversity encourages evolutionary fitness (North, 1990, p. 81). 
‘Spontaneous order’ in VET summarises the position that, left to themselves, 
employers, trade unions and workers will reach arrangements that suitably 
balance their interests and supply VET in the right qualities and quantities – or 
at least better than the next best alternative approach. Government may be the 
instrument of their interests but should not take an independent position. The 
contrary principle, ‘spontaneous disorder’, is that if government does not take a 
firm line, instead of merely ‘holding the ring’, chaos will result. The weak will 
be exploited by the strong, there will be a lack of standards, an absence of 
coordination, all leading to under-investment in human capital and economic 
decline relative to those countries benefiting from strong leadership. 
At least from the ‘second industrial revolution’ (say around 1870), when 
science-based technologies in electrical engineering and chemistry became 
more important and foreign competition intensified, questions began to be 
asked about Britain’s approach to the new circumstances (for instance, the 
Royal Commission on the Depression in Industry and Trade, 1886). Could ‘on 
the job’ training be considered satisfactory in times of rapidly changing 
technology? Technological change may require the use of abstract knowledge 
by both workforce and management. In addition, how much practical training, 
rather than mere time-serving, was actually supplied ‘on the job’? 
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The impact or effectiveness of VET might be measured by the proportion 
of ‘skilled’ labour in the workforce. But this would beg the question of how 
skilled they were, as well as how they acquired their skills. Another approach, 
common to assessing the value of investment in education more generally, is to 
consider the higher wages available to those with VET as attributable to the 
VET itself. In a competitive labour market, these higher wages should reflect 
the greater contribution to the output of the economy consequent upon the 
investment in VET. 
The Market for VET 
To understand the effectiveness for industry of the British approach to 
vocational education and training, it may be helpful to distinguish between the 
supply and the demand sides of the market. The supply of education and 
training might have been either autonomous or responsive to industrial 
demand/needs. If supply did respond, how rapidly did it do so? How closely 
did VET track the changing needs of industry? More fundamental is the 
question of whether the supply should have been more autonomous. If business 
really knew what education and training was needed, then a purely passive or 
fully responsive education supply would be effective. Otherwise some 
leadership by government or the educational sector itself may have been 
necessary for full effectiveness. 
VET concerned British policy makers both because of their interest in 
national efficiency and their responsibilities for controlling and developing 
young people. Why should government intervention be supposed to improve 
national efficiency? Market enthusiasts might contend that workers and 
employers left to their own devices would choose the optimum level of 
training according to the returns earned in the form of wages and profits. 
Workers could pay for necessary training with lower initial wages or by direct 
purchase or by other contractual forms, if their future earnings were 
sufficiently enhanced as a consequence. 
The conventional response is that nowadays there is evidence of market 
failure in the higher rates of return that are generated by investment in training 
than in comparable outlays elsewhere (Ritzen & Stern, 1991).[1] As part of the 
analysis of market failure a distinction has been drawn between general and 
specific training. The point of the categorisation is to determine who has an 
incentive to pay for investment in skill or VET.[2] The employer has a motive 
to pay for firm-specific skill investment as long as labour turnover is not too 
high. Workers with greater skills raise the firm’s productivity and profits in the 
same way as do better machines. But unlike machinery, employees can change 
firms of their own volition. Since the worker can take general skills with him or 
her when moving jobs, it should be in the employee’s interest to invest in them 
and so raise their wages. However, an incentive is not the same as the power to 
take action. 
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Four general sources of, or reasons for, market failure can be 
suggested.[3] They are: 
1. Risk. Investment in any particular form of training might generate ‘high’ or 
‘low’ returns on the available information. If workers are risk averse they 
will undertake less training than if returns are certain. Although investment 
by firms in specific training is also risky, a firm can pool risks over a number 
of different workers. So the weakness of investment will be on the side of 
workers rather than employers. 
2. Liquidity constraints might prevent a worker paying for otherwise profitable 
training. Nobody will lend to the employee to allow payment for the 
training now in the expectation of being paid back from the higher wages. 
The effect is likely to be strongest on those born into the poorest families, 
unable to invest in their children’s careers. 
3. Complementarity between general and specific training. Returns to general 
training are likely to be higher when combined with specific training and, 
conversely, returns to specific training are probably greater in conjunction 
with general. Employers will not invest enough in specific training if 
workers do not have the right general educational background. Equally, 
workers will invest insufficiently in general training if they think that 
inadequate specific training will follow. Without labour turnover workers 
and employers could negotiate contracts whereby employers paid a part of 
the general training costs. But if workers may leave before employers 
recoup the cost of their training then employers will be loath to pay for the 
investment. Labour turnover reduces the payoff to general and to specific 
training when there is complementarity. 
4. Transaction costs in signalling to other employers the outcome of general training. If 
employers do not recognise each other’s general training, in effect it is 
transformed into specific. Without, say, national or industry-level 
accreditation which enforces recognition, there is less than the full possible 
social return from the investment. A worker changing firms would not be 
paid as much as the training warranted. 
A caveat to all market failure analysis including this one is that to be relevant 
for policy, the impact must be quantitatively significant and proposed 
correctional intervention must be both effective and less expensive than the 
failure to be rectified. 
Apprenticeship 
The apprenticeship system can be represented as a way of financing VET by a 
long-term contract, particularly to avoid the second source of market failure 
above. Apprenticeship allows an initially very low-productivity worker first to 
be paid more than they are worth to the employer in terms of extra output. 
Subsequently, as the training given takes effect, productivity rises above the 
wage so that the employer recoups the ‘investment’ or ‘loan’ to the worker 
(see Figure 1). Data for the beginning of the twentieth century show 
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apprentices’ wages rising by about 20% in every year of the contract (Elbaum, 
1991). Then at the end of their indenture, wages doubled or tripled. In Figure 1 
the course of wages is observable and consistent with the facts but productivity 
cannot so easily be measured. The wage jump could be interpreted as a sign of 
apprentice exploitation by barriers to entry to their trade; they could be paid 
less than they were worth because employment was restricted, not to repay the 
costs of their training. 
The Elbaum story is that apprenticeship survived because it performed an 
economic function – an example of ‘spontaneous order’ (rather than, say, a 
simple barrier to entry). But this is not necessarily ‘Panglossian economics’; it is 
possible at the same time to recognise that there could have been better ways 
of training or incorporating new technology into production. In the USA 
greater labour mobility and opportunities meant enforcement of the 
apprenticeship contract was problematic. Employers could never be reasonably 
certain that they would recover their investment in the early phase of an 
apprenticeship. They therefore abandoned apprenticeships, instead adopting 
technologies suitable for unskilled labour or ‘poaching’ skilled labour from 
other countries. Public education was developed in response to the perceived 
‘youth problem’ left by the absence of US apprenticeship. 
 
Figure 1. A theory of VET by apprenticeship. 
Pre-Industrial Revolution Apprenticeship 
Non-vocational education would have been an oddity in the Middle Ages. 
Traditionally, British universities were intended to train the clergy for posts in 
the Church, though some graduates might also find employment in the civil 
administration. The less exalted trades typically obtained trained manpower 
through formal or informal apprenticeship – by ‘on the job’ training. 
The clearest starting date for a history of British vocational education and 
training is the Elizabethan 1563 Statute of Artificers.[4] Guild control of 
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industrial training was replaced with statutory apprenticeship (though still 
monitored and enforced by guilds). Seven-year terms were required before a 
trade or craft could be exercised (reduced to four years in 1768) and a master 
was to have no more than three apprentices (Lane, 1996, pp. 3-5). The 
arrangement was an instrument of social control in the face of the disorders 
created by a market economy and the undirected energy of young males. 
Apprentices and servants typically lived with the master under the same roof. 
Restrictions on apprentices included prohibitions on hunting in 1692 and in 
1757 on playing specified games of hazard especially in public houses. 
In 1709 the premium that a master could charge for an apprentice was 
taxed (one quarter of a million apprentices were recorded in 1710-1762 but 
there was much under-registration). Higher premiums were paid if the 
apprentice was in some way handicapped. The highest premium paid, to 
Levant merchants in London, was £200 in the 1660s and 1670s (Lane, 1996, 
p. 19). The greater the pay-off from the accreditation or the knowledge 
acquired, the greater the premium that could be charged. Russian apprentices 
to English masters paid £30-£120 compared with £4-£40 for native apprentices 
in 1716-18. Premiums also were higher the more expensive the materials with 
which the apprenticed worked and was likely to damage through error. 
Wages were paid in kind – food, lodging and clothing. When apprentice 
productivity was low, these costs would not be covered, and the premium 
provided an offset. ‘ For the first two years an apprentice cost more than he 
was worth’ (Landes, 1998, p. 224). With industrial progress the productivity 
curve might be expected to shift upwards and a premium becomes less 
necessary. A wage progression could then be introduced, whereas at low 
productivity this could be below subsistence. 
The Privy Council recorded in 1669 that the 1563 Apprentice Law had 
‘been by most of the judges looked upon as inconvenient to trade and 
inventions’ (Clapham, 1966, p. 259). More than a century later these views 
were elaborated by Adam Smith, who regarded apprenticeships as a restrictive 
practice reinforced by statute, intended to limit output and keep up prices. ‘In 
Sheffield no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time by a 
bye-law of the corporation’ (Smith, 1904, I133). If parents and tradesmen 
wished to agree training contracts then statutory enforcement was 
unnecessary. Apprenticeship demoralised young people by separating their 
effort from their reward. A seven-year contract was needless to learn even a 
complicated trade like clock or watch making. A few weeks at the outside 
would suffice, Smith maintained.[5] Although it was true that a great deal of 
practice was required in order to build up skill, this was better achieved if the 
novice paid for his own mistakes with wasted material. He would receive his 
financial reward when he produced a good product (assuming, as Smith does, 
that there was no financing constraint). 
The customer was not protected by apprenticeship because poor quality 
was most often a matter of fraud. Certification of quality was a far better 
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quality guarantee – as with the sterling mark on silver plate and stamps on 
linen and woollen cloth. 
In his condemnation of apprenticeship Smith was driven by indignation 
about statutory enforcement. He did not concede that learning a trade could be 
more than just a technological training matter which in any case could benefit 
from sustained advice on how to rectify mistakes and improve practice. The 
self-employed craftsman could teach an elite apprentice how to judge and buy 
raw materials, to keep accounts and to cultivate contacts with clients, 
customers and suppliers as well (Lane, 1996, pp. 242-243). But by the 
eighteenth century, the spread of wage labour meant that such relationships 
would be a minority and Smith’s charges would have general force (Dunlop, 
1912, p. 224).[6] 
Guilds or corporations, originally composed of small craftsmen, were 
ineffective in a world of large rich employers. Wealthy masters were unwilling 
to be restrained by guilds and were too powerful to be controlled. ‘What told 
against the guilds told against apprenticeship.’ Sir Frederick Eden in 1790 
disputed Smith’s contention that corporations enforced apprenticeship 
(Dunlop, 1912, p. 238). They were just irrelevant. A 1701 complaint to the 
Commons maintained that fewer than half of the 3500 wool weavers in the 
Taunton area had served apprenticeships. This was a trade that clearly fitted 
into Smith’s world-view. More macabre evidence for the pervasiveness of 
apprenticeship in the first half of the eighteenth century is that 40% of those 
hanged at Tyburn had been apprentices (a high proportion were butchers). 
London however was very different from England and Wales as a whole, 
where apprenticeship never bound the great majority of manual workers 
(Clapham, 1966, p. 260). 
For this majority the principal official economic concern was that they 
should not become a claim upon the local taxpayer under the terms of the 1601 
Poor Law Act. On occasion this might stimulate local authorities to invest in 
training. The Poor Law authorities in Hitchin, Hertfordshire in 1618 paid for 
their charges to receive training in wool work and later in flax. These overseers 
also apprenticed the poorest children for whom they were responsible into 
what was often a disguised form of servitude. Houses of Correction could be 
places of industrial training but, as the name suggests, this was rarely their 
principal function. In 1695 a Quaker published a proposal for a ‘College of 
Industry’ to provide training but no action was taken and state policy did not 
begin seriously to address VET for most of the population for some centuries 
(Clapham, 1966, pp. 299-301). 
The date of publication of Smith’s condemnation of apprenticeship (1776) 
approximately marks the complete breakdown of the Elizabethan system – in 
wool, knitting, watch making and calico, but elsewhere apprenticeship 
continued, often in modified form. The poet John Keats was apprenticed to a 
surgeon in Edmonton in 1811. Three years later he abandoned his 
apprenticeship to work as a dresser or junior surgeon at Guy’s and St Thomas 
Hospitals. Apprenticeship persisted often under a different name (such as 
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‘articled clerk’) where professions were able to take over the regulatory 
functions of the medieval guilds. This was so where the technology allowed the 
‘master craftsman’ mode of production to continue and where foreign 
competition was unlikely to erode nationally established monopolistic 
practices. Manufacturing industry was not so protected and for this reason, 
with industrialisation abroad, the arrangements for VET in the sector were 
more prone to be scrutinised critically by the later nineteenth century than was 
VET for professional services. 
Did apprenticeship as the principal source of VET exercise the harmful 
effects that Adam Smith claimed? The skill differential from the fifteenth 
century to the 1890s, including Smith’s period, in the building industry 
remained unchanged (Phelps Brown & Hopkins, 1955). This suggests the 
supply and productivity of carpenters relative to labourers was regulated 
broadly to maintain the percentage differential. Wages were in fact ‘sticky’, 
they supported a customary lifestyle and would not change in response to 
‘short-term’ excess demand or supply. But if these disequilibria persisted 
ultimately there would have been irresistible pressure to change.[7] As long as, 
and because, there was no big or rapid technology change that shifted the 
demand for labour suddenly, relative supplies of skilled and unskilled men 
never altered sufficiently to put irresistible pressure on wage differentials. 
Apprenticeship arrangements controlled the supply of carpenters so as not to 
disrupt relative wages. Apprenticeship terms and conditions, as well as 
numbers taken on, may be assumed to have adjusted to maintain the 
traditional differential[8] – not necessarily in the interests of would-be 
apprentices or of buyers of building services. After the Great Fire of London in 
1666 carpenters petitioned against permitting ‘foreigners’ to do their much 
expanded work, or if they were permitted, they should not be allowed to take 
apprentices (Clapham, 1966, p. 260). 
The accelerated pace of industrial change and the impact on VET was 
marked by an act of 1802 regulating hours of work of ‘factory apprentices’ and 
specifying the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic. Since Poor Law 
authorities paid premiums for their orphan charges to be indentured to factory 
owners, the system became tainted as a form of juvenile slavery. The 
requirement of serving an apprenticeship before practising a trade was legally 
abolished in 1814. Long before then, the institution had lost its former general 
function. Thereafter apprenticeship survived in particular trades, not because 
of statutory support, but because of the agreement of the contracting parties, in 
accordance with ‘spontaneous order’. 
VET in the Industrial Revolution and After 
Modern technical education is often thought to have begun in England, 
entirely independently of government, with the first Mechanics Institute in 
London in 1823 (Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927). Professor John 
Anderson of the University of Glasgow lectured on practical physics to an 
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audience including a number of working men in 1760. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, George Birkbeck gave special lectures at the ‘Andersonian 
Institution’ in Glasgow on Natural Philosophy for ‘mechanics’ and was amazed 
at their popularity (Curtis, 1967, pp. 471-472). When he moved to London, his 
successor Dr Ure continued the lectures. Birkbeck was a member of a 
committee that founded the Mechanics Institute eventually to become 
Birkbeck College of the University of London. By 1860 there were 750 such 
institutes, of which 300 with about 20,000 students were in Lancashire and 
Yorkshire – the classic Industrial Revolution regions (Committee on Industry 
and Trade, 1927). 
Mechanics Institutes were originally intended to teach artisans the 
principles underlying their trade through evening classes. The institutes were 
not solely concerned with technical education and generally became less 
occupied with it as the years passed. Partly this stemmed from the weakness of 
students’ basic education necessary to understand technical education (market 
failure 3 above) (Wrigley, 1986, pp. 164-166). The other driver was students’ 
thirst for general education. In some cases institutes eventually merged with 
local literary and philosophical societies. 
The Society of Arts began to set exams for artisans in 1855. During the 
first century of its existence the Society aimed to encourage manufactures and 
the arts by the award of medals.[9] For example in 1757 the Society conferred 
awards for spinning in workhouses and for carpet manufacture. In response to 
severe deforestation over the previous century, and in order to boost the 
availability of timber for shipbuilding and industry, the Society began to offer 
prizes for tree planting and subsequently for the domestic cultivation of opium. 
In 1851 it held the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park. 
The year after the Great Exhibition, and in response to the international 
comparisons made there, the Government established the Department of 
Practical Art to reform the schools of industrial design. A science division was 
added the following year. This Department made funds available for technical 
education, for example giving grants to existing navigation and trade schools. 
From 1859 the Department covered the teacher costs of science classes – aimed 
at ‘the industrial classes’ at the lowest cost to the Government and on the 
premise that the Government was not to be involved further.[10] By 1864 23 
subjects were recognised for support. As the Board of Education in 1899, the 
former Department of Science and Art recognised 25 subjects. By then £200,000 
a year was being spent and students in classes exceeded 170,000 (Roderick & 
Stephens, 1972). These classes could not cover trade training for fear of 
antagonising trade unions and employers (Argles, 1964, pp. 21-22). They 
therefore restricted themselves to abstract teaching and so reinforced the view 
that technical education had little to offer industry. 
The Revised Code of 1862 shunned practical work for ordinary 
elementary schools. ‘Top-up’ classes of Science and Art Dept provided science 
and technical instruction in pseudo-secondary school (Sanderson, 1994). For the 
elite, science classes began to appear in public schools. Rugby was the first 
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school to take up science and was highly praised when the Devonshire 
Commission investigated scientific education in schools in 1871. 
Reacting to the Devonshire Commission’s survey of technological 
advances in foreign countries,[11] the City Livery Companies (survivors of the 
medieval guilds) appointed a committee in 1877 to specify a national scheme of 
technical instruction (Curtis, 1967, p. 495). They established a national system 
of exams in which there were 151 passes in 1879, rising to 14,750 by 1914. Their 
City and Guilds of London Institute (1878), which founded Finsbury Technical 
College, offered payments to teachers. City and Guilds classes were reckoned 
to be more practical than those of the Science and Art Department.[12] The 
Institute established a large Central Technical College at South Kensington in 
1884 (eventually Imperial College). 
The Royal Commission on Technical Instruction 1884 provided the 
impetus to the Technical Instruction Act 1889, which empowered local 
authorities to raise a penny rate in aid of technical education. By a political 
accident in 1890 a 6d (penny) a gallon tax on spirits was handed to local 
authorities for technical instruction or rate reduction. Eventually, 160 colleges 
were financed by this ‘whisky money’. These colleges in turn gave rise to 37 
‘junior technical schools’ by 1913. Junior technical schools began in 1905 (in 
imitation of the French écoles primaires supérieures started in the 1830s) 
(Sanderson, 1994).[13] A constraint on the expansion of numbers of technical 
schools was that they were expensive – by comparison with grammar schools – 
and suitable teachers were scarce. 
The distinctive characteristic of technical education in England at the 
beginning of the twentieth century remained evening classes. Sidney Pollard 
(1989, p. 194) observed that those who made an effort to attend them, will have 
valued them, been selective and worked hard. But Michael Sanderson (1994, 
p. 6) believes that too often evening classes were a waste of time and 
money.[14] Teachers liked the top-up income and employers did not want to 
lose labour during working hours, but students were too exhausted after a long 
day’s work to take much in. Yet he also concludes that (Sanderson, 1999, 
p. 161) the system of technical education evolved through 1870-1914 into a 
satisfactory, even impressive, one. Colleges sprang up in industrial provincial 
towns.[15] Funded by local industrialists, their curricula and research were 
determined by national and regional industrial needs, their students came from 
industrial backgrounds and up to one half went on to careers in industry. The 
London polytechnics beginning with Regent Street in 1882, and numbering 11 
by 1898, provided artisans and clerks with classes in technical education as well 
as sports. The problem for Sanderson was the inadequate use made of the 
system. Some compulsory day release would have been desirable, he judges. 
The variety of private sector provision of VET is illustrated by the 14 
railway companies that ran their own technical classes. Mather and Platt in 
Manchester went so far as to attach a school to their works. To ensure 
relevance of the teaching, drawings of work in progress through the shops 
were made in the school. Alfred Marshall at Bristol around 1880 introduced a 
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sandwich degree with six winter months of the year in college, and the summer 
months spent as articled pupils in large workshops. But Marshall observed that 
the cooperation of heads of large firms was needed and by implication this was 
not always forthcoming (Marshall, 1920, p. 174, fn. 3). The trade cycle could 
disrupt training, especially if a company was forced to close. Instead of 
certification, there was the reputation of the firm to sell the apprenticeship, yet 
reputations take much time to build up and may become out of date. 
Paul Robertson (1984) noted that successful late nineteenth-century 
industries include shipbuilding with no technical education. The industry 
ignored what was available and believed none was needed. Craft 
apprenticeship in this industry was ‘more important as a trade union device for 
controlling entry’ (Jeremy, 1998, p. 396). Michael Sanderson (1999) contends 
that the metal mining industry received good educational support but there 
was not enough of it. On the other hand, Sidney Pollard (1989, p. 176) 
maintained that an average of only four students a year in mining, metallurgy 
or the geological survey from the College of Mines entered British industry 
between 1853 and 1871. Extending the period to 1895, only 20% of graduates 
did so, mostly going into mining and brewing (where there was a regulatory 
requirement). In cotton there was no education available or requested. 
Sanderson concludes that any failure in VET was in the period 1870-1890 rather 
than in the two decades before the First World War. Yet a neglect of formal 
VET may be reflected in the insufficient flexibility shown by these industries 
when economic conditions changed after the First World War.[16] 
Despite the decline of Elizabethan apprenticeship described by Dunlop 
for the previous century, ‘Apprenticeship was the single most important source 
of skill 1870-1914’ (More, 1980, p. 41) – though it was for supervisory and 
technical staff not ordinary manual workers (More, 1980, p. 215). ‘Behind the 
decline of apprenticeship 1870-1914 lay mechanisation and an unwillingness to 
lose independence for 4-6 years when the craft might be obsolete in an era of 
rapid technological change’ (Sanderson, 1994). In engineering apprenticeship 
was remarkably persistent. Of 226 engineering firms in 1917, 43 maintained a 
pupillage system and 62 took on secondary school boys for an apprenticeship 
that involved part-time study (Pollard, 1989, p. 201). Unskilled boys earned 
more than apprenticeships but skilled craftsmen earned twice as much as 
unskilled labourers. Internal rates of return to a person investing in an 
apprenticeship were 21 % or 27% depending on whether the alternative was 
unskilled work or semi-skilled (Elbaum, 1991). 
These returns would look favourable for many industrial investments at 
the end of the nineteenth century; rentiers were content with yields of 3%. 
They are therefore evidence of human capital market failure or 
monopolisation, despite the institutional arrangement of apprenticeship that, in 
principle, might have avoided it. The high rates of return signal under-
investment and a source of lower national income and economic growth than 
necessary. This was an opportunity for intervention to encourage VET. 
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Apprenticeships did not persist simply because unions wanted them, 
according to Elbaum (1991), since unions could not normally impose a closed 
shop. In engineering and building, firms hired as many apprentices as they 
chose. Smaller firms ‘trained’ many more than were needed for their own 
purposes – apparently a form of ‘dilution’. But the lack of consensus behind the 
institution is shown by the engineering union’s persistent, if ineffective, 
attempts to exert control. In 1845 the union in Manchester aimed to limit 
apprentices to ‘the standard regulation of the trade namely one boy to four 
men’ and later more generally, it ‘remained a keystone of the general wages 
policy of the Society’. However, in Sunderland between 1883 and 1885 the 
union’s strike to limit apprentices was defeated (Jefferys, 1945, pp. 24, 34, 
102-103). 
The Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall (1920) wanted to revive ‘the 
apprenticeship system in a modified form so the apprentice is taught in the 
workshop all the subdivisions of one great division of trade supplemented by 
theoretical knowledge of all branches of the trade acquired in a technical 
school’. He describes the ‘premium apprenticeship’ that typically involved a 
payment of £50-£600 for young men who were destined for leading positions in 
industry (Pollard, 1989, pp. 200-201; Jeremy, 1998, p. 396). 
By restricting VET to apprenticeship at the intermediate stage and 
ignoring basic training, Steve Broadberry (forthcoming) has constructed a new 
measure of British vocational skills. This allows him to conclude that, relative 
to the USA and Germany, before 1950 there is no evidence of a British shortfall. 
He estimates the proportion of apprentices in 1906, 1925 and 1950 in industry 
in Britain and compares them to proportions in Germany and the USA. The US 
pattern is for a small number of intermediate qualifications – apprenticeship – 
but more higher-level qualifications. Germany has more apprentices in industry 
but overall, when weighted by wages, Britain appears to have a high level of 
vocational skills in services and is not pulled down by a low productivity 
agricultural sector as is Germany. However, inevitably Broadberry is unable to 
measure fully VET stocks.[17] 
The long decline of apprenticeship and the scant provision of education in 
some quarters was perceived to create a training vacuum for the majority of 
the young population. An Edwardian memorial from the Associated British 
Chambers of Commerce to Winston Churchill drew attention to the mass of 
unskilled workers in Britain who received no training at all. Selling newspapers 
was a typical ‘dead-end’, low-paid occupation that the Association contrasted 
with provision in Germany (Sheldrake & Vickerstaff, 1987, p. 6). Of boys 
leaving London elementary schools in 1899, 42% became errand boys and two-
thirds in the following decade went into unskilled jobs (Sanderson, 1994). The 
gap between the school-leaving age of 12-14 and apprenticeship at 16 
encouraged moves into ‘dead-end’ jobs. The ‘youth problem’ was not 
alleviated by the Education Act 1902, when the science and art schools became 
real technical schools, with a wider curriculum. In the planned German system 
matters were very different. Georg Kerschensteiner, Director of Education in 
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Munich in the first decade of the twentieth century, arranged for 20,000 
children to be taught 56 trades free of charge in seven specially equipped 
schools.[18] Germany had virtually no ‘dead-end’ problem. 
Echoing Adam Smith more than a century earlier, Marshall maintained 
that public exhibitions, trade associations, congresses and journals were the 
great agencies of technical education for adults (Marshall, 1920, p. 175, fn. 1). 
‘Compared with the German educational system the British was indeed 
chaotic’ (Pollard, 1989, p. 194). The German system was an all-embracing net 
which swept in everyone who might profit from formal or technical education. 
It was geared much more closely to later occupational needs with a system of 
widely understood leaving certificates. But it was wasteful and rigid, with a 
government-dictated curriculum. Some Germans maintained there was 
nothing in Germany in the first decade of the twentieth century to match 
Cambridge in physics, Sheffield or Birmingham in metallurgy and Leeds and 
Manchester in textile chemistry and dyeing. The switch to war technology 
shows the speed of response and flexibility of British industry, in dyestuffs, 
optical glass, and aircraft frame dope (Pollard, 1989, p. 197). Large British 
manufacturers thought they could always buy in scientific expertise if they 
wanted it; they did not need in-house investment. 
There is no doubt that there were many commissions, investigations and 
initiatives in British VET during the later nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century (the Newcastle Commission 1861 on primary education, the 
1864 Clarendon Commission on the fee paying ‘public’ schools, the 1868 
Taunton Commission on the endowed/grammar schools, Samuelson’s Select 
Committee on Scientific Instruction 1867-68, the 1871-76 Devonshire 
Commission, the 1881-84 Royal Commission on Technical Instruction, the 
Royal Commission on the Depression in Industry and Trade 1886, the 
Technical Instructions Act of 1889, the 1902 Education Act …). Moreover, 
Britain showed continuing inventiveness in new technology in which VET 
institutions played a part. The Honourable Charles Parsons went on to an 
apprenticeship in Armstrong’s after graduating from Cambridge and before his 
path breaking steam turbine work. Joseph Swan demonstrated the first electric 
light bulb at a meeting of the Newcastle Literary and Philosophical Society in 
1879. Professor William Ayrton of Finsbury Technical College was such an 
international authority that he played a major role in transferring electrical 
technology to Japan. 
However, the question remains whether, at any date, sufficient activity of 
the appropriate quality for the economy as a whole was undertaken. The 
impression given jointly by the rates of returns to apprenticeship, by Table I 
and the ‘dead-end problem’ outlined above, is that VET was excessively scarce. 
Table I indicates that most of the population aged between 14 and 21 were 
untouched by any formal tuition. There were sufficient evening classes for 
approximately each school leaver to take one, but in practice a few would take 
several and in any case many of the classes offered were not VET. 
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Additional evidence of under-provision of VET is the British comparative 
disadvantage in high-wage, high-skill sectors in 1880, 1910 and through to the 
interwar period (Crafts & Thomas, 1986). In each of five years between 1880 
and 1935, exports tended to be higher in industries with lower skills, as 
measured by wages. Although supply of VET matched demand, there was 
arguably a deficiency of demand for VET to offset British comparative 
disadvantage in skill-intensive activities. While every exporter must have a 
comparative disadvantage in some factors, as a wealthy early industrialiser, 
Britain’s pattern of development should almost certainly have emphasised 
skills. That the market did not signal skill shortages then must have been a 
consequence of various market failures, of which in addition to those giving 
rise to high returns to apprenticeship, management failings in recognising and 
adopting the appropriate technologies should be considered. 
 
 Graduates 
in science 
and 
technology 
from civic 
universities 
City 
and 
Guilds 
passes 
Students 
in 
technical 
college 
evening 
classes 
Day 
students in 
engineering 
classes in 
four college 
Students 
in full-
time post-
secondary 
technical 
courses at 
technical 
colleges 
Apprentices 
1870     19 - - 114   
1879 -      151 - -   
1880     55      515 - 119   
1890   166   3,507 - 193   
1893 - - 120,000 -   
1900   378   8,114 475,000 376   
1910-1914 
(various 
years) 
1231 
(431 
technology) 
14,105 708,000 613 1,199 
(engineers 
584) 
343,000 
(1906) 
 
Table I. Measures of vocational education and training 1870-1914. Source: More, 1980; 
Sanderson, 1999. 
 
Typically untrained in theoretical and technical skills themselves, management 
was in general unlikely to have a full appreciation of the value of such 
knowledge in their employees.[19] Higher technological education for 
engineers struggled for acceptance against the conservatism of the Institution 
of Mechanical Engineers until the eve of the First World War (Guagnini, 1993). 
Other political pressures established by British history pushed in the same 
direction. Trade union concerns about the price of skilled labour would hardly 
incline them favourably towards state efforts that would benefit the employer 
and lower the wages of their members. The tradition of small and 
parsimonious government, coupled with laissez-faire economics, was 
reinforced by the religious societies’ views of general education and their part 
in it. Only the accident of whisky money provided for what state-financed 
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technical education there was. The few state-aided ‘Industrial Schools’ were in 
fact juvenile open prisons.[20] 
Aside from any industrial need, there remain questions of social control 
and personal development of young people that the USA addressed by 
expanding higher education more energetically than Britain. It is hardly 
reasonable to maintain there was a deficiency of VET purely on these grounds, 
independently of industrial demand. A more credible solution was liberal 
education, although later experience in the twentieth century suggested 
compulsion could discourage motivation to learn. Government did eventually 
plug the gaps in the provision of elementary education by religious societies 
through the creation of School Boards in 1870 and by making such education 
compulsory after 1880. 
VET from the First World War 
The Government was able to expand VET when it chose. War production 
required a massive government training effort, pioneered by Christopher 
Addison at the Ministry of Munitions. By 1918 there were 100 equipped 
technical schools and nearly a dozen large instructional factories able to 
accommodate 400-800 learners each. Government could do this because the 
task of war production, and therefore of the new training institutions, was 
simple compared with that of the peacetime economy. Even so, more might 
have been done after the war, if only for able-bodied ex-servicemen, had it not 
been for union hostility and the post-war budget cuts (Sheldrake & Vickerstaff, 
1987). Then the Ministry of Labour took over responsibility for training but 
only covered disabled ex-servicemen. Trade union pressure in the face of 
unemployment restricted even this scheme. Also depressed economic activity 
discouraged employers from taking on ‘improverships’. 
By 1925-26 it was estimated that only one-third of the under-21s in the 
engineering industry were apprenticed, with a further 11% learners (Jefferys, 
1945, p. 205). Unemployment continued to take its toll so that, by 1938, of 1300 
firms a mere 16% employed indentured apprentices. The use of the 
apprenticeship contract to supply cheap labour rather than training is illustrated 
by the 1921 strike over paying apprentices by results (Jefferys, 1945, p. 221). 
More (1980) estimated the number of male apprenticeships in the mid-
1920s was 368,000 – by way of comparison the number of boys leaving public 
elementary schools in England and Wales in 1924-25 was 364,000. The 
predominant length of apprenticeship was about five years so at the most one 
in five male school leavers found their way into apprenticeships. The official 
view was that there were probably seven non-apprentices to every apprentice 
among youths aged 14 to 21 (Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927, p. 146). 
The same survey of training also expressed muted concern about a 
number of sectors. In mechanical engineering ‘appreciation of training 
frequently depends on the amount and kind of training the managers have had 
themselves’. In iron and steel, while there was an excess demand for 
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metallurgists, less training was insisted on for operatives ‘than is altogether 
good for the industry’ (Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927, pp. 191, 201). 
In coal mining, miners were ‘likely to be under-educated even from the 
viewpoint of safety’ – shift working rendered attendance at evening classes 
impossible (Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927, p. 204). 
If VET between the world wars was deficient and there were increasing 
skill shortages then this could have been reflected in changes in relative 
remuneration. Two occupations in which Britain was castigated for being weak 
were chemistry and electrical engineering. Comparing such figures as are 
available with those for solicitors and general medical practitioners suggests a 
faster rate of increase for the salaries of the second two occupations than for 
the first two in the interwar years. Over the First World War period (1913-14 to 
1922-24) in the ‘old’ professions average salaries rose by over 90% whereas 
chemists’ salaries increased by only 77% and engineers achieved merely 60%. 
By 1935-37 engineers’ salaries had fallen while those of the ‘old’ professions 
were up 45% for medical practitioners and 12% for solicitors. Entry barriers 
and foreign competition apparently controlled salary movements. Those 
trained in the new trades were not earning substantial economic rents because 
of training supply shortages (Foreman-Peck, 1994). 
Nonetheless, there were ways in which a ‘shortage’ could be revealed 
without the type of relative price movement considered above. There might be 
very high rates of return to investment in skills at the existing wage structure, 
because of market failure or monopolisation. Moreover, if top management 
have effectively no technical training then they may be unable to recognise 
opportunities for investment and employment of technologically advanced 
skills. In international perspective, the educational backgrounds of British top 
management are consistent with this possibility (Cassis, 1997). In 1907, 37% 
had university backgrounds compared with 57% of their equivalents in 
Germany and 72% in France. Of British managers of the largest businesses, 
18% experienced apprenticeship training compared with 31% of comparable 
managers in Germany and 7% in France. The ordering of these figures across 
countries remained unchanged over subsequent decades, although there was a 
tendency for the university-educated proportion to rise and the apprenticeship 
proportion to fall. 
Alternatively or additionally supervisory or shop-floor grades with the 
right levels of training might be impossible to recruit, rendering unprofitable or 
uncompetitive various lines of activity (Prais’s [1995] explanation for the last 
two decades of the twentieth century). In 1936 one in four school leavers 
attended an evening class but of these only a small minority studied a technical 
subject (Foreman-Peck & Hannah, 1999, p. 32). 
Unemployment soon displaced other policy concerns and wartime VET 
experience was utilised as a solution with the Unemployed Training Schemes. 
These had a capacity of 6500 places on six-month courses. But since graduates 
needed to find jobs in industry, widespread unemployment ensured that only 
about half the places were taken up until the mid-1930s. Other supposed 
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training initiatives in effect invoked the New Poor Law (1834) principle of ‘less 
eligibility’ to ensure that unemployment claimants were genuinely seeking 
work. Instructional centres put on 12-week residential camps usually 
undertaking forestry work (Sheldrake & Vickerstaff, 1987). 
In 1937 the engineers’ union managed to extend their control over 
numbers of apprentices to negotiating over their wages and conditions as well. 
Around 32,000 apprentices went on strike. The agreement reached was for a 
wage that was a fixed proportion of that of the adult workers (Jefferys, 1945, 
pp. 244-245).[21] The union judged that the decay of apprenticeship between 
the wars was due to ‘exploitation’ (Jefferys, 1945, p. 263). But the consequences 
of the fixed proportion wage for the viability of the apprenticeship model of 
training should be apparent from Figure 1 above. 
Technical education of the workforce between the world wars 
deteriorated or at least did not improve. Absolute numbers of skilled workers 
changed little between 1911 and 1951 (Matthews et al, 1982, p. 109). From 1911 
to 1931 the ratio of skilled to total manual workers fell – the combined impact 
of war and unemployment not offset by special government schemes. Official 
anxiety about the small number of apprentices and a shortage of skilled labour 
crystallised in 1927 with the ‘interrupted apprenticeship scheme’ (Sheldrake & 
Vickerstaff, 1987). Ex-servicemen participants were paid what they would have 
received had training not been interrupted while they were apprenticed; about 
100,000 passed through the scheme. 
 
 City and Guilds Institute   
 Craft 
Certificate 
Technician 
Certificate 
Ordinary National 
Certificate 
Higher National 
Certificate 
1929 - -   1.2   0.5 
1938 - -   3.3   1.1 
1951   18.6     9.0 11.0   5.6 
1964   47.7   37.9 23.0 12.8 
1973 183.2 131.0 21.6 15.1 
 
Table II. Number of workers acquiring technical qualifications 1929-73 (thousands).  
Source: Matthews et al, 1982, table to note 24, p. 634. 
 
A government initiative in 1921 introduced the Ordinary and Higher National 
Certificate qualifications but numbers of workers with technical qualifications 
remained few compared with those in the great boom after 1945 (Table II). A 
similar tale of underachievement is the rise of the technical schools. By 1918, 61 
had been established (Sanderson, 1994). Pupils increased by a factor of three to 
over 30,000 between 1919-20 and 1937-38. Yet by the last date technical school 
students accounted for only 2.6% of boys and 1.4% of girls of school age. Years 
of schooling of the labour force continued to rise. Formal education added 
0.2% to the quality of the labour force every year on average between 1856 and 
1893 and 0.4% between 1873-1937. Technical education was estimated to have 
improved the quality of the labour force by 0.1% a year between 1856 and 
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1937[22] (Table III) (Matthews et al, 1982). Was this a lot, a little or close to the 
ideal? As a proportion of the growth rate per head over the period it was about 
one-tenth. Formal education was estimated to have contributed three times as 
much. A doubling of the technical education effect, another 0.1% on the 
growth rate over the years 1856 to 1937, would have raised income per head in 
1937 by 15% or 20%. 
Consistent with a shortfall in VET, a very large ‘human capital’ effect 
explains differences in relative US-British productivity among industries in the 
mid/later 1930s (Broadberry & Crafts, 1992). American industrial productivity 
was massively higher than that in Britain and the USA made minimal use of 
apprentices. A 1% rise in relative US/British human capital across industries 
was associated with roughly a 1% higher relative productivity.[23] If Britain had 
invested more human capital in any particular industry the productivity lag 
behind the USA would have been reduced. Steve Broadberry (1997) contends 
that this result stems from the USA adopting mass production techniques in 
contrast to the ‘craft production’ of British industry. Mass production did not 
need the skills supposedly imparted by apprenticeship but only required 
unskilled labour. The greater US human capital was in the managerial and 
supervisory levels and in research. Yet for human capital to have such a strong 
aggregate effect it is likely to have been rather more pervasive. Greater human 
capital more plausibly allowed larger throughput processes and more 
productive technologies in the USA. 
 
 Formal education 
(%) 
University education 
(%) 
Technical education 
(%) 
1856-1873 0.2 0 0.1 
1873-1937 0.4 0 0.1 
1937-1964 0.4 <0.05 0.2 
1964-1973 0.3 <0.05 0.2 
 
Table III. The contribution of education to improvement in labour quality 1856-1973  
(annual percentage growth rates). Source: Matthews et al, 1982, p. 111. 
 
With rearmament and another world war the Government once more 
temporarily became proactive in VET to ensure a shortage of skilled labour did 
not hamper the war effort. Sixteen General Training Centres established by 
1939 expanded under the pressures of war to 35 by the end of 1940, training 
30,000 people. By 1941, 75,000 workers were trained in single machine/job 
skills, but labour shortages meant that only three-quarters of the available 
training places were filled. Between 1940 and 1945 almost 300,000 workers 
completed engineering courses. Training was generally poor or low grade and 
those trained were usually squeezed out of their jobs at the end of the war 
according to Sheldrake & Vickerstaff (1987) – though the aggregate statistics 
suggest a more optimistic conclusion. 
Vested interests played a part in the success and failure of training 
initiatives. Ernest Bevin, then Minister of Labour, secured trade union 
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cooperation during the war on condition of ‘business as usual’ and full 
employment afterwards. Consequently, the immediate post-war training 
agenda concerned only youth issues and demobilisation. Follow-up pamphlets 
to the Butler Education Act (1944) suggested Local Education Authorities 
should consider extending technical school provision. But there was no 
requirement to do so in the Act and expansion was very limited. The few 
technical schools were eventually swallowed up by the new ‘comprehensive’ 
schools (Sanderson, 1994). 
By 1953, 70 industries formally had adopted nationally agreed training 
schemes but local implementation and knowledge of schemes were weak. 
Trade unions maintained defensive controls over conditions of entry to 
apprenticeship (Sheldrake & Vickerstaff, 1987, p. 28). As far as the 
apprenticeships themselves were concerned there was a concentration on the 
form (for example duration) rather than content (what should be learned). 
There was still no standard system of qualification other than time-serving (to 
which Adam Smith’s condemnation continued to apply). 
Indirect evidence continued to suggest inadequacies of VET in 
manufacturing industry. The contribution of human capital to the US/British 
labour productivity gap was even greater in 1950 than it had been in the 1930s 
(Broadberry & Crafts, 1996). In 1910 the USA had employed almost twice as 
many engineers as a percentage of the labour force and in 1950, after Britain’s 
wartime expansion of engineering, the USA still utilised one and a half as many 
(Peck, 1968, p. 452). If Britain’s concentration upon apprentices and non-
professional technicians instead of professional engineers by comparison with 
the USA was simply a rational response to skill scarcities, relative wages of the 
two types of skilled labour would have been radically different in the two 
economies, but they were not. US experience suggests that more professional 
engineers and fewer non-professional technicians would have raised 
productivity. 
Even though the school-leaving age had been raised (to 15) in 1947, the 
small numbers completing British secondary school education in the 1950s 
limited the opportunities to implement this option. In 1961, 12% of 17-year-
olds attended school full time compared with 75% for the USA in 1960. 
Complementarities between secondary schooling and VET then contributed to 
an undersupply of professional engineers and skilled personnel. As a 
consequence, in the mid-1950s Britain employed the lowest proportion of 
technically qualified staff in the metals, food and electrical industries among 
seven Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries 
surveyed (Peck, 1968, p. 459). This position was exacerbated by basic research 
and aviation probably accounting for one-quarter of the deployment of 
Britain’s technical manpower. Britain produced more science and technology 
graduates than Germany (or France or Italy) (Edgerton, 1996, p. 54). However, 
more relevant for VET, this is not true of ‘technology-only’ graduates. In 
1954-55, 55% more graduated in France and 22% more in West Germany. 
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Britain appeared to supply more science graduates than ideal, who then 
substituted at lower wages for engineers in industry (Peck, 1968). 
The incoming Labour Government attempted to adopt a coordinating 
role with the Industrial Training Act of 1964. This established a Central 
Training Council of six employers and six trade unions and made provision for 
an Industrial Training Board (ITB) to manage a levy/grant system that in 
principle addressed at least one possible market failure – employers’ ‘free-
riding’ on others’ investment in training. By 1966 13 ITBs covered 7.5 million 
workers – and were causing complaints about the administrative burdens on 
small firms. Training numbers in manufacturing increased by 15% between 
1965 and 1969, and they increased faster in ITB industries. 
Nonetheless, the 1968 Donovan Commission remained critical of deep-
rooted restrictive practices governing training. Similarly, the Ministry of 
Labour maintained that both sides of industry were short-termist. The Institute 
of Personnel Management observed that in apprenticeship training there was a 
continuing conflict between standardisation and flexibility. There was 
inadequate liaison with further education. Typically, the quality of training was 
poor with, for example, little systematic feedback, and the period of 
apprenticeship lasted too long (Singer & Macdonald, 1970). 
Aggregate data suggest that in historical perspective this pessimism was 
not wholly justified, though in absolute terms it probably was. The great post-
war boom saw a break in trend with numbers of skilled manual workers 
increasing between 1951 and 1961. But the proportion of skilled to total manual 
workers fell at an accelerating rate over the two decades after 1951. By 1971 the 
ratio of skilled to total manual workers was at about the level achieved 40 years 
earlier. 
Matthews et al (1982) contend that the numbers and proportion of 
apprentices increased over the war period. Given the expansion of engineering 
and other export industries while foreign competition was muted, this is not 
unexpected. The proportion of male school leavers aged 15 to 17 entering 
apprenticeships was about 35%.[24] Before the war a figure nearer 20% was 
likely. Relative to Germany the apprenticeship position looked less buoyant. 
Apprentices accounted for some 3% of British manufacturing employment in 
the 1960s, whereas in Germany the figure was 5% (Broadberry, 1997). This 
may well have contributed to the labour productivity gap between German 
and British manufacturing that by 1968 reached some 20 or 30%. More (1980) 
estimated that young trainees in manufacturing peaked in 1964 (240,000 
apprentices and 149,000 other trainees, just 13% more than the total of 
apprentices for 1906). 
Leaving aside apprenticeship, the quality of the labour force after 1945 
increased markedly when measured by qualifications (Table II). Workers 
acquiring City and Guilds technician certificates increased by a factor of 14 
between 1951 and 1973, and those gaining craft certificates increased 10 times. 
The upshot was perhaps a doubling of the contribution of technical education 
to the growth in labour quality to 0.2% in the period 1937-1973. The impact of 
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formal education showed some tendency to decelerate on the other hand, from 
a growth of 0.4% per annum between 1937 and 1964 to 0.3% over the 
following decade. 
German workers held more qualifications: according to 1978 data, 60% of 
German workers possessed vocational qualifications against half that 
percentage among British employees even on generous definitions (Prais, 
1981). Some maintain this is merely German ‘credentialism’: an obsession with 
qualifications for their own sake (Locke, 1985), but the association with higher 
productivity suggests otherwise. 
The oil price shocks ended the post-war boom and the British economy 
passed through an especially difficult decade. By 1979 sectors employing higher 
proportions of workers with professional and technical competence, and with 
higher earnings, tended to export more (Smith et al, 1982).[25] This was the 
reverse of the relationship found for the early twentieth century. Although 
reversal appeared to indicate an improvement in investment in human capital 
in the post-1945 period, there was now a rising tide of skill-intensive imports. 
Both the research and development and skill intensity of British imports 
increased faster than those of exports (Katrak, 1982). Again, since there was 
little relative price evidence of skill shortages, the inference must be, not that 
VET supply was becoming more inadequate for what was demanded but that 
market failure persisted and perhaps also that management failed to recognise 
the VET that should have been undertaken. 
Postscript 
A measure of the effectiveness of VET, British labour productivity, declined 
relative to the USA, France, Germany and Japan, from 1870 (Table IV). During 
the great boom after 1945, and more so in the 1980s and 1990s, Britain caught 
up the USA somewhat but failed to recover the 1913 relative position. Because 
for much of the post-1945 period comparisons were made only with West 
Germany, the lower productivity of Germany as a whole throughout the 
period may appear surprising. When manufacturing industry productivity 
alone is compared the results are very different. The US-British ratio remained 
around two and the German-British relationship oscillated around parity 
(Broadberry, 1997, ch. 2). International trade in comparable goods probably 
ensured that these ratios were broadly maintained, while changes in efficiency 
were reflected in the size of the sector. Gross domestic product (GDP), with 
the higher proportion of non-traded or non-competing goods, is therefore a 
better index of national performance. 
Investment in human capital, either the quantity or the quality, is an 
obvious possible contributor to the slippage in GDP productivity (Broadberry, 
1997, ch. 6). From the later 1970s the Government therefore entered the direct 
provision of VET for younger people.[26] By 1980 German manufacturing was 
apparently 40% more productive than British, with some 7% employed as 
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apprentices. The British proportion was a little over 2%, falling to 1% at the 
end of the 1980s. 
 
 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998 
Britain 113 84 63 67 79 
France    61 56 46 76 98 
Germany   69 59 32 62 77 
Japan   20 21 16 49 65 
 
Table IV. Relative labour productivity: levels of GDP per hour  
worked 1870-1998 (US = 100) (source: Maddison, 2001, E9). 
 
Prais (1981, 1995) and other researchers at the National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research established a link between the low qualifications of British 
workers in particular sectors and their low productivity. Prais also identified 
shortcomings in the state secondary and primary education systems in contrast 
to continental Europe (especially Switzerland). This kind of study has been 
very rare in its attempt to establish a line of causation between 
education/training and industrial performance. Comparison of hotel 
productivity in Britain and Germany found that in both countries the operative 
level (housemaids) held no qualifications. The big difference was at the 
supervisory level, the housekeeper. In Britain none had a qualification whereas 
in Germany a substantial proportion held a certificate. The practical difference 
this made was that in Germany supervisory staff used PCs for stock control and 
time planning for instance, whereas in Britain they did not. Consequently, 
British management were obliged to undertake these tasks, and were therefore 
left less or no time for the more strategic management issues of arranging block 
bookings and such like. Hence productivity was much lower in Britain. Similar 
behaviour and productivity was observed in other industries such as biscuit 
manufacture. 
Statistical analysis reached similar conclusions. Prais’s (1981) cross-section 
regressions demonstrated that intermediate qualifications were the most 
significant education variables in predicting performance of an industry by 
country. A corollary was that, comparing industries, as skill intensity rose, any 
British labour productivity advantage declined (Davies & Caves, 1987). 
While these years in some respects, such as the decline of apprenticeship 
almost to extinction, may differ from earlier periods, the shortfall in human 
capital formation seems to be part and parcel of a bigger picture of British VET 
history. With the pervasion of market forces and international competition 
from the later nineteenth century if not earlier, market failures in this field 
became serious but were not remedied by state action. 
Conclusion 
Although it may not be true, the view underpinning the British style of VET is 
entirely plausible; that users of VET, employers, are in the best position to 
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know the most appropriate content and methods of communication of 
VET. What is not so obvious is that employers will also provide the best 
possible coordination between themselves and employees in the provision of 
VET. No employer will ‘free-ride’ on another’s efforts to provide general VET 
for instance; there will be no ‘market failures’, such as under-investment in 
firm-specific VET because of inadequate general VET. Often employers are 
successful because they are lucky and risk takers. But luck does not usually 
persist when the environment changes. Under- or inappropriately educated and 
trained employers must not, as it seems they will, tend to favour workforces 
like themselves. 
It is not enough to note that for more than a century the Germans 
operated a coherent and all-embracing VET system and to conclude that 
because the British did not, their arrangements must have been inadequate. 
Additional evidence is needed of clear British (or German) shortcomings in 
supply or consequent deficiencies in economic performance. Here lies the 
challenge of an analytical history of VET. Any long-run study of British VET is 
hampered by the difficulty of measuring how much VET was undertaken. The 
next problem is establishing how effective was that VET. Then there remains 
the task of explaining why the particular supply configurations were adopted. 
A weakness of the British style of market-driven VET was the dependence 
on stable output and employment conditions for effectiveness. With deep and 
long cycles of boom and slump the system was likely to break down because of 
the difficulty of long-term planning. Judging by the aggregate data, this seems 
to have occurred in the years between the world wars and perhaps after the oil 
shocks of the 1970s. By contrast the great post-war boom after 1945 appears to 
have been associated with a massive expansion of VET – certainly as measured 
by City and Guilds qualifications. 
There was no shortage of initiatives in VET. The question is whether 
they were the right type and available in sufficient volume. Since Britain 
slipped relative to its competitors in the later nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, under-investment in labour skills is an obvious suspect. Aggregate 
tests are consistent with a British comparative advantage in less skill-intensive 
products. Yet continuing prosperity and substantial economic growth in Britain 
must depend on specialisation in skill-intensive activities. The greatest gap 
between American and British labour productivity occurred in sectors where 
skill differences were greatest. This contribution to comparative advantage is 
clinching evidence for a VET failure. The detailed industry-level research of 
Prais and collaborators for the 1980s and later provides the closest connections 
that suggest inadequate supplies and quality of VET. The conclusion here is 
that the preceding century showed the same shortcoming in manufacturing 
industry.[27] 
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Notes 
[1] The only rate of return to education estimate for Britain before the 
contemporary period appears to be the returns to literacy estimated by Mitch 
(1984): 
 Males (%) Females (%) 
1839-43 9.0-42.5 Under 1-16.5 
1869-73 5.0-20.5 Under 1-18.0 
 
All these rate of return estimates depend upon assumptions about what would 
have happened. Typically, wage differentials of literates over illiterates, or 
trained over untrained, provide the estimate of the returns on the assumption 
that if the untrained had been trained they would have received the wages that 
the trained actually received. 
[2] What counts as a general or a specific skill depends on the industrial and 
locational context (Prais, 1995). 
[3] These sources of market failure go some way to addressing Sidney Pollard’s 
(1989, p. 138) concern: ‘What is lacking is an adequate theory ... to lay bare 
why years spent at school or college should improve the economic 
performance of a nation ... .’ 
[4] This coercive legislation provided for regulation by Justices of the Peace of 
wages and employment. Qualified craftsmen might be compelled to work at 
their craft, women up to the age of 40 could be compelled to take service and 
men not otherwise employed might be required to work in agriculture 
(Clapham, 1966, p. 213). Statutory definitions of skilled trades were influenced 
by whether a guild existed; brickmakers, millers and domestic weavers and 
spinners were defined as unskilled for instance (Clapham, 1966, pp. 256, 240). 
[5] The division of labour in watch and clock making was extreme (Landes, 1998, 
p. 242). The area between Prescott and Liverpool was dotted with cottages 
specialised in making individual components – these will not have required 
lengthy apprenticeships. Within the workshop, where assembly took place, 
there was plenty of rough menial work for apprentices – stoking fires, beating 
plates, cleaning metal – which could equally well be undertaken by any 
unskilled workers. The master craftsman planned, ordered components, 
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supervised assembly and assured quality. Whether a novice could do this must 
be doubted, whatever Smith contended. 
[6] Although Adam Smith denied that formal apprenticeship was needed for 
specific training in the eighteenth century, he recognised complementarities 
between general and specific training or education and the likelihood of market 
failure in the provision of the first of these. He proposed that general 
education, including some geometry and mechanics, should be provided, 
subsidised by the state, to ‘the labouring classes’ as an offset to the stultifying 
effect of highly specialised jobs. Geometry and mechanics would often prove 
useful in almost all trades (Smith, 1904, vol. II, pp. 302-303). In addition prizes 
could be given to encourage and reward excellence (as did the Society of Arts 
by the time Smith was writing, see below). More radical, but entirely consistent 
with Smith’s outcome-based approach, was the proposal that before a person 
could set up in a trade they should pass an exam. 
[7] Building workers supplied a product that was not traded across regional or 
national boundaries. When transport costs – including trade controls, the 
disruptions of war and banditry – were sufficiently low, workers in other, 
‘traded goods’ industries supplied products the prices of which could be 
determined by conditions independent of local supply and demand conditions. 
In such cases skill differentials also could be independent of the ‘local’ VET 
system. However, until the nineteenth century it seems unlikely that this effect 
would have been significant. 
[8] If we suppose that for seven years the apprentice forewent 70% of what could 
be earned as a labourer and then for 30 years earned 50% more, the internal 
rate of return was 18%. Forgoing only 50% raised the return to 22%. 
[9] The Society itself was an imitation of the Dublin Society for improving 
Husbandry, Manufactures and other Useful Arts, which had been established in 
1731. 
[10] The middle classes were expected to pay fees to finance their training. 
[11] In turn the 1871 Devonshire Commission had been triggered by the poor 
showing of British design and technology at the 1867 Paris Exhibition. 
[12] City and Guilds took over technological exams formerly conducted by the 
Society of Arts. 
[13] The 1902 Education Act repealed the Act of 1889 and technical instruction was 
included in higher education provided by local authorities and financed by 
whisky money. 
[14] At least for factory employees. Self-employed craftsmen were more willing to 
try to conquer fatigue because it seemed more clearly in their interests. 
Personal communication from Michael Sanderson, 2 November 2002, based on 
an essay on Norwich education. 
[15] Owens College was reformed in 1873, Leeds was founded in 1874, Sheffield in 
1879, Birmingham in 1880 and Liverpool in 1881. In smaller towns there was 
Southampton in 1862, Exeter in 1865, Newcastle in 1871, Bristol in 1876, 
Nottingham in 1881 and Reading in 1893. 
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[16] Of course difficulties stemmed from the collapse of demand but the rise of the 
motor ship constructed elsewhere than in Britain suggested nonetheless that 
there was entrepreneurial failure in shipbuilding (Henning & Trace, 1975). 
Even when this industry’s shortcomings had been amply demonstrated, 
employers’ attitudes did not change. The Government acquired the Jordanvale 
shipyard in Glasgow during 1942 for training purposes but could not recruit. 
The industry continued to prefer exclusively ‘on the job’ training. 
[17] It should also be noted that comparisons with other countries do not necessarily 
identify socially optimum levels of investment. 
[18] For Kerschensteiner’s philosophy see Winch (2004).  
[19] Roderick & Stephens (1972) see British nineteenth-century VET as deficient 
because ‘unfortunately at an early stage it was decided that what Britain lacked 
was an efficient system for the industrial masses and a science based training for 
artisans’, and the needs of management were supposedly ignored. 
[20] There were 36 such residential schools with 2822 children in 1858 (Curtis, 1967, 
p. 303). 
[21] Cf. Matthews et al (1982), who state that in 1935 there were fewer restrictive 
practices than previously. Admittedly engineering is only one sector but it is a 
key exhibit of apprenticeship. 
[22] Matthews et al (1982) add the caveat that their numbers could be out by 50% or 
more. 
[23] Human capital is measured by earnings. If all labour only possessed general 
skills then an industry’s wage bill per head (‘earnings’) would reflect the skill 
composition of the labour force. Wages of employees with general skills are 
determined by the productivity of the economy as a whole. Differences in 
average earnings levels between industries would reflect variations in the 
composition of the labour force. Higher average earnings then were a 
consequence of a greater proportion of employees with substantial human 
capital. 
       By contrast, industry-specific skills in principle will be rewarded by higher 
wages when associated with higher industry productivity, at least in the short 
run. How long that period is depends upon entry barriers to those acquiring 
the skills, and the length of training; in summary upon the relevant 
components of the VET system. But since changes in industry productivity 
were not associated with changes in wages in these years, the evidence favours 
general rather than industry-specific skills. 
[24] They observe that the official figures in the Ministry of Labour Gazette were 
probably too high. 
[25] Analysis similar to that of Crafts & Thomas (1986) for the late 1940s confirmed 
that the relation between exports and ‘skill’ had changed immediately after the 
end of the war. This might prompt concerns that the negative relationship in 
1935 was due to the pattern of trade protection that Britain then faced and that 
the new configuration stemmed from the excess demand for British goods in a 
war-damaged world under reconstruction. 
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[26] Consistent with the market ‘working’ at one level, earnings and employment 
benefited from degrees and private sector apprenticeship, but government 
schemes typically conferred no advantages on people up to 23 years old 
(Dolton et al, 2001). 
[27] No consideration has been given in this article to services, where there are 
prima facie grounds for expecting less VET market failure than in industry. 
Under-investment in VET is likely to have stemmed from, among other 
reasons, lack of family resources. To the extent that the middle classes favoured 
the professions and other services over industry, their more comfortable 
financial positions would have allowed families to invest more in their 
children’s VET, reducing the shortfall relative to that in industry. 
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APPENDIX 
VET Chronology 1563-1964 
 
1563  Statute of Artificers 
1754 Society of Arts of London ‘for the encouragement of arts manufactures and 
commerce’  
1799 Dr George Birkbeck lectures on Natural Philosophy at University of Glasgow 
1802 Factory Act regulating hours of work of ‘factory apprentices’ and specifying the 
teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic 
1814 Abolition of the requirement of serving an apprenticeship before practising a 
trade 
1823 London and Glasgow Mechanics Institutes founded 
1824  Manchester Mechanics Institute 
1836 House of Commons votes £1500  for Normal School of Design 
1845 Royal College of Chemistry founded 
1851 Great Exhibition; government School of Mines and Science founded 
1852 Department of Practical Art of the Board of Trade (includes Science from 1853) 
1855  Society of Arts introduces exams 
1867 Paris Exhibition 
1878  London City and Guilds Institute 
1883 Finsbury Technical College 
1889 Technical Instruction Act 
1902 Education Act reorganised science schools to become secondary schools 
1905 Board of Education Grants given for junior technical schools 
1921 Institute of Mechanical Engineers introduces Ordinary National Certificate and 
Higher National Certificate 
1964 Industrial Training Act  
 
